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Croatia employed macroprudential measures to manage 
credit growth and capital inflows during the boom years 
of the 2000s, including reserve requirements on loan 
growth, a marginal reserve requirement on increases in 
foreign liabilities, foreign exchange liquidity minima, and 
elevated capital adequacy ratios. Although quantitative 
analysis is complicated by substantial overlaps among 
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
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measures, the econometric results in this paper suggest 
that the measures were most effective in requiring banks 
to hold high liquidity and capital buffers, and less 
effective in slowing credit growth and capital inflows. 
Larger buffers seem to have helped Croatian banks 
weather the financial crisis, making the adjustments to 
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Croatia represents a case of active attempts to manage credit growth and capital inflows 
during the boom of the 2000s. These efforts at macroprudential management were made through 
a  variety  of  measures  such  as  the  introduction  of  reserve  requirements  on  bank  liabilities, 
marginal  reserve  requirements  on  foreign  liabilities,  liquidity  minima,  and  credit  growth 
restrictions. 
One motivation for the adoption of macroprudential policy measures in Croatia starting in 
2003  was  the  concern  that  conventional  monetary  policy  would  not  effectively  curb  credit 
growth.  Croatian banks’ access  to foreign funding sources  had  improved, due  in part  to  the 
presence of new foreign owners in many of the largest banks and also to eased conditions on 
international credit markets. Croatian banks had also received a significant windfall as a side 
effect  of  the  introduction  of  euro  banknotes  in  2002—Croatian  savers  had  large  amounts  of 
accumulated legacy currencies that they placed in banks in late 2001.  Relatively little of this 
money  flowed  out  of  the  banking  system,  creating  substantial  funding  sources  for  credit 
expansion. (Kraft 2003 and Kraft and Šošić 2006)  In addition, banks had accumulated excess 
reserves during the recovery from the 1998–99 recession as lending standards were tightened and 
credit growth was slow, but deposit growth continued apace.  None of these factors could be 
directly controlled by conventional monetary policy. 
At the same time, the restructuring of the banking system lowered the cost of credit on the 
supply side.  Among the important cost-lowering factors were the removal of bad assets from the 
banking system through bank failure and bank rehabilitation, improvements in bank efficiency as 
a  result  of  privatization,  the  introduction  of  new  techniques  and  technology,  and  increased 
competition. (Kraft 2000, Galac 2005) 
Furthermore, central bankers suspected that the price elasticity of credit demand was low 
in Croatia.  Since many credit products, including housing and car loans, had been practically 
unavailable  or  extremely  limited  in  Croatia,  there  was  strong  pent-up  demand.    In  addition, 
weaknesses in the credit culture, such as the lack of a credit register and weak legal protection of 
creditors, likely led borrowers to believe that they would not face severe consequences if they 
failed to repay a loan, which reinforced credit demand.  Finally, expectations of rising income, as 
well as aspirations for ―European‖ living standards, also underpinned credit demand. 
To limit credit growth, the central bank imposed a reserve requirement, known as the 
credit  growth  reserve  (CGR),  on  increases  in  banks’  loan  portfolios  in  2003.    When  loan 
portfolios grew more than 4 percent in a given quarter, banks were required to purchase low-yield 
central bank bills in an amount twice the overrun.  This limit was removed in 2004, and imposed 
once again in an even stricter form in 2007. 
                                                 
1 Background paper prepared as background to a forthcoming World Bank report titled ―Golden Growth: Restoring 
the Lustre of the European Economic Model.‖ The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the authors 
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its affiliated organizations, or (iii) the Executive Directors of the World Bank and the governments they represent. 
All  errors  and  omissions  remain  entirely  the  responsibility  of  the  authors.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at 
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The  imposition  of  the  CGR  in  2003  reflected  the  central  bank’s  assessment  that  the 
acceleration  of  credit  growth  did  not  primarily  reflect  one-off  factors.    While  the  euro  cash 
conversion effect had been large, trend growth in credit had been increasing throughout 2000 and 
2001, albeit from a low level.  Over the course of 2002, the central bank became more and more 
convinced that credit growth would not decelerate substantially without policy intervention, and 
it moved to impose the CGR. 
To address the problem posed by the capital flows underlying credit growth, the central 
bank also imposed a marginal reserve requirement on increases in banks’ foreign liabilities in 
mid-2004.  This requirement, too, was tightened over time.  
The  factors  underpinning  rapid  credit  growth,  while  including  some  idiosyncratic 
features, resembled those in other transition countries.  However, Croatia’s financial system is 
quite different from most other transition countries in one respect: it has an extremely high level 
of unofficial euroization. In particular, foreign exchange deposits and other liabilities make up 
about 75 percent of banks’ balance sheets, and a similar percentage of bank assets are either 
denominated in foreign exchange or indexed to the exchange rate.  This had major implications 
for monetary policy because the potential for balance sheet effects under high euroization made it 
desirable to manage the exchange rate rather tightly. (Mishkin 1997 discusses the general issue of 
balance sheet effects.)  The persistence of high levels of Euroization also helped shape Croatia’s 
approach to macroprudential policy. 
Deposit euroization implied that the central bank’s ability to play the role of lender of last 
resort (LOLR) in a deposit run was limited.  This consideration was further underlined by the 
recent failure of the Argentine currency board, where arrangements for lines of credit to provide 
an LOLR in foreign exchange were perceived to have failed in the 2000–2001 crisis.  In Croatia, 
concern  about  the  lack  of  an  LOLR  in  foreign  exchange  led  to  the  imposition  of  minimum 
foreign exchange liquidity requirements in 2003. 
At  the  same  time,  widespread  indexation  of  the  principal  value  of  loans  to  the  euro 
exchange rate meant that Croatian banks were exposed to foreign currency-induced credit risk 
(FCICR)—the  risk  that  borrowers  would  be  unable  to  meet  increased  loan  payments  after  a 
substantial currency depreciation. (Cayazzo et al 2004)  The central bank tried to address this 
potential  problem  by  increasing  risk  weights  on  loans  in  foreign  currency  or  indexed  to  an 
exchange rate in 2004.   
Croatia experienced rapid credit growth and large current account deficits in the boom 
years despite the macroprudential measures taken.  During the crisis, Croatia avoided major bank 
failures, but nonetheless suffered a large fall in GDP, an almost complete cessation of credit 
growth, and a very slow recovery.  We believe that Croatia’s approach was most effective at 
inducing banks to maintain sufficient liquidity and capital, allowing banks to enter the crisis 
period relatively well prepared.  In this respect, Croatia’s approach partly anticipated the thrust of 
the new ―Basel III‖ prudential reforms.  At the same time, the Croatian approach had less clear 
success in slowing capital inflows and credit growth, although it is difficult to determine whether 
any other approach would have been more effective.  It is also difficult to evaluate the costs of 
the Croatian approach, since the side effects of the measures implemented were often difficult to 
capture in standard data reports, and economic effects such as misallocation of resources are not 
easy to establish.   4 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide background on the 
Croatian financial system; in Section 3 we describe the macroprudential indicators, when and 
why they were introduced, how they worked and how agents attempted to circumvent them, and 
what their results were; in Section 4, we provide a broader assessment of the effectiveness of the 
measures; and in Section 5, we discuss future challenges. Section 6 provides our conclusions. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1.  Structure of the banking system 
In the aftermath of its stabilization of high inflation in 1993, Croatia faced a strategic 
choice.  Owing to the strong preference of Croatian savers for the German mark, Croatia could 
have  attempted  to  eradicate  the  high  degree  of  euroization  it  had  inherited  from  the  former 
Yugoslavia at the risk of dramatically limiting the size of the banking sector, or it could have 
accepted the presence of a strong deposit base in foreign currency in the hopes of rebuilding 
confidence in the banking system. Croatia chose the latter (Šonje and Vujčić 1999). 
During the 1990s, both deposits and credit grew rapidly.  Although a banking crisis in 
1998–99 interrupted growth, renewed growth after 2000 led to the development of a banking 
system  with one of the highest  levels  of banking assets,  deposits, and loans to  GDP among 
transition countries.  In addition, loans to households, which had stood at only 6 percent of GDP 
in 1995, rose to over 35 percent in 2008, surpassing loans to enterprises.  This increase included 
the development of strong markets for home mortgages and car loans in particular, with major 
impacts on both household consumption patterns and financial stability. 
In part as a result of the 1998–99 banking crisis, EU banks took a dominant share in the 
Croatian banking system by 2000.  Four of the largest banks were privatized to foreigners, while 
the largest bank, which had already been privatized to a dispersed set of domestic owners, was 
bought by an Italian bank.  Furthermore, several foreign banks that had entered as greenfield 
investments gained market share through a combination of rapid growth and acquisitions.  In the 
end, more than 90 percent of banking assets were foreign owned in Croatia as of 2000, and this 
percentage changed little over the ensuing decade. 
Virtually  all  banks  in  Croatia  primarily  made  loans  indexed  to  foreign  currency  (the 
Deutschmark before 1999 and the euro thereafter) because of deposit euroization.  Foreign banks 
were not especially different from domestic banks in this respect.  However, several Austrian 
banks did play a leading role in the introduction of Swiss franc-indexed loans, beginning in 2004.  
This practice grew rapidly until the crisis, when it went sharply into reverse.   To borrowers 
unable or unwilling to take currency risk into consideration, Swiss franc-linked loans appeared 
substantially cheaper than euro-linked loans (by roughly 100–150 basis points).  
The  Croatian  financial  system  remained  highly  bank  centered  through  the  2000s.  
Mandatory pension funds grew rapidly in this period, eating into banks’ share of total financial 
system assets.  However, these pension funds were usually owned by banks and did not represent 
competition  in  the  business  of  intermediation.    There  were  periods  when  investment  funds, 
particularly stock funds, also increased their share, but most of them were also owned by banks,   5 
and their asset size rapidly shrank with the fall in share prices in the second half of 2008.
2  For 
this reason, we will not pay great attention to non-bank financial institutions in this article. 
2.2.  Monetary policy instruments 
The  choice  of  monetary  policy  instruments  in  Croatia  flows  mainly  from  deposit 
euroization and strong capital inflows.  Because of the foreign currency-induced credit risk in the 
banking system, the central bank has adopted a policy of broad exchange rate stability.  The 
kuna-euro exchange rate stayed within an interval of +/- 6.5  percent during the whole 1993–2011 
period.  The central bank reacts more to the rate of change of the exchange rate than the level and 
generally has not announced any targets or target bands. 
Capital inflows to Croatia have been substantial.  To avoid excessive appreciation, the 
central bank purchased foreign exchange from banks; but to limit potential credit expansion and 
keep monetary conditions from becoming too loose, it had to sterilize.  However, sterilization via 
the issuance of central bank paper bearing market interest rates was abandoned at the beginning 
of 2003 because of the possibility of substantial central bank losses.  Furthermore, it seemed 
possible that raising interest rates on central bank paper would not even succeed at controlling 
money  growth in  light  of the  ability of foreign banks  to  provide  additional funding to  their 
Croatian subsidiaries.  This additional funding could have allowed the subsidiaries in turn to 
purchase any increase in central bank paper while also expanding lending at their ex ante desired 
rate.  This led the central bank to look for sterilization instruments that would not in and of 
themselves directly occasion capital inflows.
3  
Additionally, there is some evidence that increased interest rates on domestic currency 
loans led to substitution into foreign currency-indexed loans.  Kraft and Galac (2011) estimate a 
simple VAR model based on  Brzoza-Brzezina et al (2010).  The impulse response functions 
suggest that most of the decrease in domestic currency loans is compensated for by increased 
foreign currency loans.  They also look at the effect of the central bank measures to increase the 
price of foreign currency ( -linked) lending to borrowers who are not hedged against currency 
risk, from mid-2006 to early 2010.  The conclusion is similar, at least in the pre-crisis period, but 
this time it is the increase in domestic currency lending  that compensates for decreased foreign 
currency (-linked) lending.  
It is interesting to note that neighboring Serbia chose to issue central bank bills despite 
these arguments.  Ultimately, high interest rates did limit loan demand because the elasticity of 
loan demand was not in fact zero.  But this approach, while relatively transparent in the sense that 
interest rates on central bank paper were formed in the market, allowing mo netary policy to use 
an interest  rate channel, was also quite costly and may have increased capital inflows and 
appreciation pressure. 
The Croatian approach, in contrast, relied on high and uniform reserve requirements on 
bank  deposits  in  both  domestic  and   foreign  currency,  coupled  with  a  marginal  reserve 
requirement on increases in bank foreign liabilities.  Remuneration of required reserves was kept 
                                                 
2 For time series data on financial system shares through mid-2007, see the CNB Macroprudential Bulletin #6, p. 29. 
3 Naturally, any form of sterilization that succeeded in limiting the money supply would raise interest rates, ceteris 
paribus. There would always be a large positive differential between the interest rate on bank loans in Croatia and the 
interest rate on similar loans in the euro zone (unadjusted for risk). However, if sterilization were done via the 
issuance of central bank paper at market rates, the central bank would pay this market rate on its liabilities, where as 
sterilization through increased reserve requirements at least would not create large interest costs for the central bank.   6 
very low to limit bank earnings and thereby limit the basis for credit expansion.  This approach 
did  not  feature  a  market-based  interest  rate  and  relied  on  reserve  requirement  rates  and 
remuneration rates set by central bank decisions. 
Fine-tuning was done via reverse repo auctions that provided liquidity for a one-week 
period.  This instrument, introduced in 2005, was not expected to play a major part in managing 
the exchange rate or in controlling credit.  Instead, it was used to allow banks to manage short-
term fluctuations in funding.  The reserve requirement and foreign exchange market interventions 
were the main structural instruments for creating or destroying money. 
The  Croatian  reserve  requirement  deserves  a  more  detailed  explanation  since  it  was 
responsible for much of the sterilization effort.  A uniform reserve requirement for domestic and 
foreign currency deposits was introduced in 2000. The requirement was decreased in two steps, 
from 23.5 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2001.  From there, the rate was only lowered again in 
December 2004 to 18 percent, and 17 percent in February 2006.  The reserve requirement was 
lowered when it was desired to create lasting changes in the money supply; it was a structural 
instrument, not a fine-tuning instrument. 
More notably, in terms of the management of capital inflows and domestic liquidity, the 
central  bank  required  that  a  certain  portion  of  the  reserve  requirement  on  foreign  exchange 
deposits be held at the central bank in kuna.  By increasing this proportion, the central bank could 
drain liquidity from the banking system.  The kuna holding requirement (KHR) was raised in 
several steps, from only 25 percent in 2003 to approximately 75 percent in early 2009, when the 
central bank was waging an all-out defense of the kuna in the face of the strongest depreciation 
pressures  the  CNB  had  confronted  since  the  end  of  high  inflation.    The  KHR’s  role  in  the 
successful defense of the currency in the first months of 2009 should not be underestimated.  
2.3. Characteristics of capital flows 
Croatia experienced substantial capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) during the boom  period.  Privatization was an important source of FDI inflows.   The 
privatization of Croatia’s largest banks occurred mainly in 1999–2000, and the privatization of 
telecoms and the oil company spanned 1998–2003.  Foreign investment was especially large in 
the banking, telecommunications, retail trade, and pharmaceuticals industries. 
In addition, government foreign borrowing grew rapidly in the 1998–2003 period.  A 
policy decision was made in late 2003 to focus government funding more on domestic sources.  
The establishment of mandatory pension funds in 2002 created an important domestic market for 
government  paper.    However,  even  when  government  bonds  were  offered  on  the  domestic 
market, capital inflows were indirectly stimulated, because the purchasers were often foreign 
bank subsidiaries whose parent banks likely added to their investment in Croatia in order to 
purchase these government debt instruments. 
The  Croatian  private  sector  also  borrowed  abroad,  although  more  modestly  than  the 
government.  These borrowings usually took the form of bank loans, including syndicated credits, 
and maturity periods for both government and private sector loans were relatively long.  
At the same time, the Croatian stock market was not particularly attractive to foreigners 
during  most  of  the  boom  period.    Few  shares  were  traded,  and  some  of  the  most  attractive 
companies, such as the leading banks, were actually de-listed when foreign owners bought them.  
In view of the high share of FDI, the relatively long maturity of most foreign debt (both public   7 
and  private),  and  the  lack  of  substantial  foreign  involvement  in  the  Croatian  stock  markets, 
Croatia had little to fear from ―hot-money‖ flows.  However, in a crisis, Croatian savers might 
well be able to very quickly transfer their savings to banks in neighboring Austria and Italy, so 
that the main concern was actually flight of deposits, along with flight from kuna instruments into 
foreign exchange (mainly euro) instruments.
4  
Croatia’s cautious approach to foreign exchange liberalization may also have limited hot-
money  flows.    While  current  account  convertibility  was  introduced  in  1995,  capital  account 
liberalization  proceeded  much  more  slowly.    The  Foreign  Exchange  Law  of  2003  allowed 
foreigners to participate in most capital markets in Croatia, but not in the primary market for 
short-term  government  debt.    It  also  allowed  Croatian  companies  to  hold  foreign  currency 
deposits in domestic banks.  The prohibition on Croatian residents giving loans to non-residents 
was removed only in mid-2010, while the ban on citizens opening bank accounts abroad was 
maintained until end-2010.  Finally, relatively strict limits on pension fund foreign investments 
are still in place, especially for investing outside the OECD countries. 
 
3. MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
Croatia introduced macroprudential measures over the years 2003–2008.  The measures 
aimed to slow credit growth, reduce capital inflows, improve bank capitalization, and bolster 
bank liquidity.  In this section, we will describe the most important measures, give details on how 
they  worked  and  when  they  were  introduced,  modified  and  withdrawn,  and  provide  some 
assessments of their effectiveness. 
Specifically, we will first discuss measures directly aimed at slowing credit growth and 
restraining capital flows.  These measures could be seen as direct efforts to manage the credit 
boom, measures that had clear macro aims.  Next, we discuss measures to ensure that banks kept 
sufficient foreign exchange liquidity, capital, and foreign exchange positions.  These measures, 
while having macro impacts, had more of a prudential or micro impact on individual institutions. 
Finally, we discuss measures that were discussed but not implemented. 
3.1.  The credit growth reserve 
The first measure, introduced in January 2003, was a form of tax on credit growth.  The 
measure defined a set of items on banks’ balance sheets and certain off-balance sheet items.  If 
the sum of these items grew more than 4 percent in a given quarter, the bank would be required to 
purchase special CNB bills paying only 0.5 percent interest.  The amount of bills to be purchased 
was twice the excess of credit growth over the 4 percent maximum.
5 
6 
                                                 
4 During the 1999 banking crisis, decreases in both kuna and foreign exchange deposits were observed. There was 
anecdotal evidence of savers withdrawing funds and driving to Austria or Italy to make deposits. However, the 
significance of this kind of behavior cannot be assessed definitively.  
5 The measure became effective on January 15, 2003. It limited the growth rate in a given quarter, defined as the rate 
of change of the sum of credits granted (excluding credit to the Government), debt instruments purchased (excluding 
Croatian National Bank bills and Ministry of Finance paper), guarantees, letters of credit, credit lines and financing 
obligations, as reported on financial statements on an end -quarter basis. All of the items were standard reporting 
items, so that there were no measurement problems introduced.   
6  The  4  percent  quarterly  growth  rate  was  adopted  based  on  the  central  bank’s  overall  financial  programming 
projections. The projections estimated the amount of bank credit required to finance the desired rate of GDP growth 
with an acceptable current account deficit.    8 
The measure was aimed at limiting the growth rate of bank credit and remained in force 
throughout 2003, but was withdrawn as of the beginning of 2004.  It was reintroduced in 2007, 
but with some modifications.  The on- and off-balance sheet items were considered separately, 
and the maximum untaxed growth rate was lowered to 1 percent per month (i.e. the maximum 
growth  of  rate  of  credit  a  bank  could  grant  without  paying  the  tax  was  lowered  from 
approximately 17.0 percent to 12.7 percent).  Not only did this new limit lower the overall rate of 
growth of credit that banks could grant without paying the tax, it also decreased banks’ flexibility 
to increase credit by a large amount in one month and then by a smaller amount in the following 
month.  
However, in the 2007 version of the measure, the amount of central bank bills required to 
be purchased was only 50 percent of the overrun.  This was raised to 75 percent in December 
2007.  In this respect, the 2007 measure was slightly more lenient than the 2003 measure, mainly 
because monthly compliance was more demanding than quarterly compliance.  The credit growth 
reserve was withdrawn in November 2009. 
The credit growth reserve was a simple and direct way to limit credit growth.  On the 
surface, it appeared quite successful as very few banks exceeded the credit growth limits and 
were required to hold the reserves.  During 2003, excess growth was extremely rare.  During 
2007–2009, overruns were more common, although mainly by small banks or, in the case of 
larger banks, for a single month.  Figure 1 shows the trend in bank lending.
7 




Since the credit growth reserve did not inhibit more rapid credit growth, it is interesting to 
reflect on the banks’ decision to avoid holding the reserve.  Simple calculations made using 
prevailing interest rates at the beginning of 2003 suggest that banks would make more profit by 
increasing lending by over 5 percent per quarter and holding the loan reserve than they would 
have by growing lending by only 4 percent.  However, almost no banks did this.  Two possible 
                                                 
7 Note that the figure does not show the exact aggregate targeted by the regulation. Instead, we have chosen to use 
simply loan growth. As is explained later in the text, this figure is less subject to the evasion activities of banks. 
8 Note that the figure sorts banks by credit growth rates, so that P -10 refers to the 10 percent of banks with the 
















































Aggregate  9 
explanations for this are that (i) banks did not want to overtly oppose the central bank, and (ii) 
banks in fact used other evasive measures to allow them to stay within the growth limit while 
extending the amount of credit that they would have desired. 
The latter explanation is plausible given the numerous evasive measures resorted to by 
banks.  For example, banks cut back on holdings of securities and on unused lines of credit, both 
items included in the credit aggregate, and used this to offset growth above 4 percent in other 
categories.  In addition, banks with affiliated leasing companies encouraged clients to take leases 
rather than loans.  Finally, banks with parent banks abroad referred clients to the parent bank, 
with all of the screening and paperwork carried out in Croatia, but the final contracts and funding, 
at least formally, coming from the headquarters outside of Croatia (Galac and Dukić 2008). 
The  2007  version  of  the  credit  growth  reserve  closed  the  line  of  credit  loophole  by 
limiting  on-  and  off-balance  sheet  items  separately  and  dealt  with  the  leasing  problems  by 
capturing funding of the leasing company within the credit limit.  However the issue of direct 
parent bank lending to clients was not resolved. 
The CGR was removed at the beginning of 2004 since it was felt that bank credit growth 
had been successfully slowed and the current account deficit had improved.
9  However, as Figure 
1 shows, credit growth began to accelerate again in mid -2004, and the current account deficit 
moved upward (Figure 2).   The central bank, aware that the CGR did produce evasion, tried a 
less direct approach with the marginal reserve requirement (MRR).   It imposed the CGR again 
only when credit growth had become quite strong, the current account deficit was accelerating, 
and the central bank was convinced that the other measures in force, including the MRR, were 
not adequate.  
Figure 2. Current account deficit and GDP growth 
 
                                                 
9 The current account deficit fell from 7.4 percent in 2002 to 5.3 percent in 2003 and 4.3 percent in 2004. It then 
climbed to 5.5 percent in 2005 and 6.9 percent in 2006, leading the central bank to tighten its policy stance, including 
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One way to gauge the impact of the credit tax is to look at the growth of the sum of on-
balance sheet bank lending, leases granted, and foreign borrowing by Croatian agents.  Figure 1 
plots the growth of this broader aggregate as well as the growth of on-balance sheet bank lending.  
We see that the broader aggregate appears more stable and, both in 2003 and during the 2007–
2009 period, shows less of an impact than the conventional bank loan aggregate. 
Figure 3. Growth of debt of households and enterprises, 2001–2010 
 
 
Nonetheless, one can see an impact of the imposition of the credit growth reserve in 2003 
and in 2007, in that the broad aggregate does slow somewhat.  Not all banks were able to use the 
evasion techniques effectively, and there very likely were customers who were unable to get 
loans because of the tax. 
These  desired  effects  of  the  reserve  should  be  set  against  its  costs,  which  included 
decreased transparency as banks scrambled to satisfy customers through more opaque channels, 
and distortion of competition as smaller banks were discouraged from growing rapidly to increase 
their market share. Smaller banks were also less likely to be able to use the evasion techniques 
described above.   
Furthermore, it could be argued that the rapid growth of small banks intending to increase 
market share would likely have led to deteriorating credit quality.  If so, the restrictions would 
have served a prudential purpose to the extent they were effective in limiting credit growth. 
Because of concerns about the impact of the credit growth reserve on small banks, there 
was discussion of limiting the measure to large banks, or of creating a dual system of lower 
percentage limits for large banks than for small banks.  However, it was feared that such an 
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In addition, there was consideration of imposing stiffer limits on lending to households 
than on lending to enterprises.  This idea was not implemented because of concerns that evasion 
could be organized by creating enterprises that in turn lent to households.  In addition, many 
individual entrepreneurs are registered as craftspeople or are in the free professions and would be 
targeted by tighter limits on household lending.  Any efforts to unravel these problems would 
have greatly complicated both the measure itself and implementation efforts. 
It might also be asked whether different approaches involving increased risk weights or 
tighter liquidity requirements might have been used instead of the CGR.  As we will explain 
below, higher risk weights were imposed on foreign currency-linked borrowing, and minimum 
capital requirements of 10 percent, above the Basel I standard of 10 percent, were imposed.  A 
foreign exchange liquidity requirement was also enacted.  However, with capital readily available 
and liquidity abundant, it would not have been easy to slow credit growth through such measures.  
Many banks had capital adequacy ratios over 20 percent and would therefore not have had much 
difficulty meeting higher capital requirements  generated by higher risk weights.   Banks with 
foreign owners also had ample liquidity buffers that would not have been exhausted by small 
changes in liquidity requirements.   
In the end, the credit growth reserve is difficult to evaluate.  It certainly was circumvented 
to a considerable degree, but it also created friction that slowed credit growth to some extent.  
Galac (2010) finds that the credit growth reserve did slow domestic lending by Croatian banks, 
but that this seems to have been offset by leasing and foreign borrowing, so that the measure’s 
effect on total private sector debt turned out to be insignificant.  This econometric evidence might 
be taken with a grain of salt, since there might have been some signaling effects of the credit 
growth reserve.  It also seems that domestic (usually smaller) banks would not have been able to 
evade the tax by shifting loans to their parent banks.  Thus, there might have been modest effects 
that do not reach statistical significance. 
The credit growth reserve was not removed immediately after the outbreak of the crisis 
because of concerns about exchange rate depreciation.  The credit growth reserve was formulated 
in nominal terms, so that a depreciation of the currency in fact increased the stock of credit by 
increasing the local currency equivalent of loans indexed to foreign exchange.  To use a concrete 
example, if the exchange rate depreciated by 3 percent, all indexed loans, the largest category in 
most banks’ loan portfolios, also grew by 3 percent. 
By keeping the credit growth reserve in place, the central bank gave commercial banks 
strong  motivation  to  avoid  currency  depreciation.    This  prevented  banks  from  intentionally 
speculating  against  the  kuna  and  may  have  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  central  bank’s 
defense of the exchange rate in the first quarter of 2009.  This, in turn, prevented the activation of 
foreign currency-induced credit risk, limiting loan losses  and helping avoid  a larger banking 
crisis. 
Only when depreciation pressures had substantially receded did the central bank lift the 
credit growth reserve, in November 2009.  At that point, banks had greatly tightened lending 
standards, and there was little chance that  any bank would exceed the  credit growth  reserve 
ceilings.  Still, the withdrawal of the credit tax signaled that the central bank was shifting to a 
recession-fighting mode and would encourage a resumption of credit growth. 
   12 
3.2. The marginal reserve requirement 
The marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was introduced as a way to slow capital inflows 
and targeted banks’ foreign funding sources in particular.
10  The MRR initially applied only to 
the increase in banks’ foreign liabilities, with a reserve of 24 percent required.  The measure was 
extended to cover deposits or other assets of leasing companies in an effort to close one of the 
major loopholes in the credit growth reserve measures of 2003. 
The MRR rate was increased in numerous steps, reaching 55 percent in 2006.  At this rate, 
it seemed that foreign borrowing would provide very little profit for banks; nonetheless, foreign 
borrowing continued.  Discussion with banks revealed that foreign borrowing continued despite 
the MRR because such loans were the only opportunity for banks to gain long-term funding 
sources.  Growth in domestic deposits was inadequate to fund banks’ credit expansion goals, 
therefore long-term funding sources were crucial to banks’ participation in the housing loans 
market  and  in  long-term  loans  for  corporate  investment  projects.    In  light  of  the  intense 
competition in these areas, banks may have been willing to accept low returns in order to build 
market share (Galac and Dukić 2008). 
However, the large jump in the MRR from 40 percent to 55 percent in early 2006, in 
conjunction with higher risk weights on foreign currency-linked loans to unhedged borrowers 
since mid-2006, created strong incentives for banks to increase their capital rather than continue 
foreign borrowing.  Several of the larger banks implemented substantial capital increases in 2006 
and 2007, raising not only their capital adequacy ratios, but also the capital adequacy ratio of the 
whole banking system.  
In the immediate aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, several 
large foreign-owned banks experienced substantial deposit withdrawals.  To allow the parent 
banks to support their subsidiaries, the central bank removed the MRR completely in October.  
The parent banks did support their subsidiaries, initially with deposits and short-term loans, and 
deposit levels returned broadly to the pre-Lehman levels.  Thus, the MRR’s removal proved 
effective during the crisis. 
Looking more broadly at the MRR’s effectiveness during the boom, Galac (2010) finds 
fairly strong evidence that imposition of the MRR led banks to increase their capital, although he 
notes that it is difficult to disentangle this effect from the effect of other prudential measures.  At 
the same time, he finds weaker evidence that the MRR actually led to decreases in gross foreign 
liabilities during the boom. 
Before concluding this section, it should be mentioned that one bank attempted to fund its 
expansion plans by issuing bonds on the domestic market.  Seeing this as an attempt to evade the 
spirit if not the letter of the MRR, the central bank implemented a 55 percent reserve requirement 
on funds  raised by bond offerings.   After that, no other bank issued bonds  on the domestic 
market.  The special reserve requirement, as this measure was called, was abolished shortly after 
abolishing the MRR. 
 
                                                 
10 The marginal reserve requirement was applied to the increase in banks’ foreign liabilities over the initial stock as 
of July 31, 2004. Foreign liabilities were defined as all liabilities to foreigners, plus deposits or other assets of leasing 
companies held at the banks. The actual amount required to be held was calculated by multiplying this base by the 
MRR rate.   13 
3.3. The foreign currency liquidity requirement 
Chronologically the first of the macroprudential measures, the foreign currency liquidity 
requirement (FCLR) required that banks hold higher foreign currency liquidity as a form of self-
insurance against runs against foreign currency deposits.  Because of the high level of deposit 
euroization in Croatia, the central bank’s ability to act as a lender of last resort in the case of a run 
on deposits could be somewhat limited.  Moreover, while some have proposed contingent lines of 
credit as a way to provide an LOLR in foreign currency, the apparent failure of contingent lines 
of credit in the case of Argentina suggested to Croatian policy makers that such a solution would 
not be reliable. 
The FCLR replaced an earlier measure that required banks to hold 53 percent of longer-
term foreign exchange deposits in banks outside of Croatia.  It required the holding of liquid 
foreign assets with a maturity of no more than 3 months to cover the reserve requirement.
11  In 
this sense, the asset side of the regulation was less onerous than an ordinary reserve requirement.  
In addition, the FCLR was lowered in numerous steps and was never increased.  
It is therefore difficult to argue that the FCLR was used countercyclically.   However, by 
not lowering the FCLR, the central bank  was able to  change the points at which other reserve 
requirements would  become binding.    Thus, a lowering of the regular reserve requirement 
without changing the FCLR might  result in a bank being unable to free up any reserves at all. 
Such interactions between measures were at times quite important during the boom period in 
Croatia. 
After its enactment in 2003, t here were attempts  by banks  to evade the FCLR , for 
example by offering local currency deposits indexed to an exchange rate.  Until the central bank 
altered its regulation in September 2006, these deposits, which display the same currency risk as 
―true‖  foreign  exchange  deposits,  were  not  covered.    This  example  reinforces  the  point  that 
regulatory  authorities  have  to  be  ready  to  closely  monitor  compliance  and  rapidly  modify 
regulation to close evasion channels.  In this case, the loophole was easy to close, but matters are 
often not so simple. 
3.4. Limits on currency mismatch in banks’ balance sheets 
Matching  assets  and  liabilities  by  currency  is  a  basic  principle  of  risk  management.  
However,  regulators  have  often  found  it  necessary  to  limit  banks’  open  foreign  exchange 
positions.  The Croatian National Bank (CNB) had imposed such limits since the early 1990s, but 
by  raising  or  lowering  these  limits  was  able  to  affect  credit  conditions.    Net  open  foreign 
exchange positions were limited to 30 percent of capital in 1995.  Positions must be calculated 
daily,  and  reflect  the  sum  of  positions  in  each  individual  currency  in  which  the  bank  does 
business. 
12  The limit was lowered during the boom to inhibit currency risk.   In April 2003, a 
                                                 
11 The numerator of the ratio, foreign exchange assets, includes foreign currency cash and checks, foreign exchange 
transaction  accounts,  foreign  exchange  held  with  the  central  bank,  foreign  exchange  deposits  with  a  remaining 
maturity of less than 3 months, debt instruments issued by foreign banks and governments that are available for sale, 
and debt instruments  issued  by foreign banks and governments that are held to  maturity but  have a remaining 
maturity of less than 3 months. The denominator of the ratio includes foreign exchange deposits received, foreign 
exchange debt instruments issued by the bank, foreign exchange and indexed loans received, foreign exchange and 
indexed hybrid instruments, and any other financial obligations denominated in foreign exchange. 
12 The calculation of the open position requires calculation of net spot and net forward positions in each currency the 
bank uses. The individual currency positions are summed up. In addition, net positions in off -balance sheet items   14 
new  regulation  was  issued  lowering  the  allowed  open  position  to  20  percent  and  including 
embedded options in some kinds of foreign currency loans. 
While this limit was certainly justified as a means of limiting overall financial system 
risk, most banks easily met them during the boom period.  The regulation only affected a few 
banks, and the tightening of the regulation in 2003 did not seem to have significant effects.  The 
limit was raised to 30 percent at the end of March 2010, giving banks more flexibility to accept 
foreign currency deposits or loans, without necessarily having to extend indexed loans.  While 
this does seem to have facilitated banks’ operations, it does not appear to have been particularly 
effective at restarting credit growth.  
3.5. Higher risk weights on loans linked to foreign currency 
Driven  by  the  regulations  limiting  foreign  currency  mismatch  and  by  basic  risk 
management principles, banks extended loans to clients in kuna, but indexed the loan principal to 
an exchange rate.  Most common in Croatia are loans in kuna whose principal is revalued at each 
installment based on the kuna-euro exchange rate.  
After several years, it became apparent that banks were not pricing in the credit risk 
caused  by  extending  these  loans  to  borrowers  whose  income  is  purely  in  kuna.    Loans  to 
unhedged borrowers and hedged borrowers bore the same interest rates.  This seems to be the 
result of a free-rider problem: in the case of small exchange rate changes, increases in defaults 
would be minor; but in the case of large exchange rate changes, all banks would experience 
increased defaults, and there would likely be strong pressure on the central bank and government 
to assume banking system losses.  
Conversations  with  bankers  revealed  a  different  line  of  thought.  Bankers  most  often 
argued that increased risk weights were unnecessary since the central bank would not allow a 
significant depreciation of the exchange rate.  We would argue that this point of view indeed 
reflected a free-rider mentality and also a degree of disaster myopia. 
This reasoning was especially suspect in the case of Swiss franc-denominated loans.  As 
many countries discovered in 2008 and 2009, even a relatively stable exchange rate with the euro 
did not preclude swings of as much as 10 percent with the Swiss franc.  Hungary in particular 
suffered from this problem. 
In Croatia, the indexation contracts stipulated that monthly principal payments were based 
on the exchange rate at the end of the month, so that a 10 percent depreciation on, for example, 
the 15th of a given month would result in a 10 percent increase in borrowers’ installments due on 
the last day of the month.  This provided a very rapid transmission of exchange rate shocks to 
borrowers, likely producing strong effects on consumption and, over a longer period, on default 
rates.  
The  measure  adopted  to  deal  with  lending  indexed  to  foreign  currency  to  unhedged 
borrowers was an increase in risk weights, introduced in June 2006.  Banks were required to 
document  whether  borrowers  had  natural  hedges,  and  if  not,  they  were  required  to  apply 
                                                                                                                                                              
such as guarantees in foreign exchange must be calculated, along with net positions in any other assets or liabilities 
whose value would change with currency fluctuations. 
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increased risk weights.
13  It turned out that very few borrowers were hedged, and banks were 
required to raise substantial amounts of capital. 
The increased risk weights on foreign currency borrowing were certainly a prudential 
measure intended to better align capital requirements with risk profiles at the level of individual 
banks.  However, in light of the difficulty in precisely measuring the foreign currency -induced 
credit risk present in bank balance sheets, the precise amount of the increased risk  weights was 
difficult to determine.  In practice, the central bank was able to increase these risk weights when 
it felt that risks were building up in the banking system as a whole at the beginning of 2008.  
In addition, the central bank made repeated public statements aimed at famil iarizing 
borrowers with the risks involved in loans indexed to foreign currency, since it was clear that 
borrowers tended only to consider the interest rate offered, ignoring the currency risk. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of Basel II actually forced the Croatian National Bank to 
abandon this approach to FCICR.    One possible  alternative  was  to use Pillar II of the new 
framework to require banks, on a case -by-case basis, to recognize the risks  associated  with 
unhedged borrowers.   This could also be done via the  Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 
Process (ICAAP).  It remains to be seen whether such an approach will be as effective as the 
rough and simple approach adopted by the CNB under Basel I. 
3.6. Higher capital requirements for fast-growing banks 
When the credit growth reserve expired at the end of 2003, it was initially replaced by a 
capital requirement for rapidly growing banks.  This measure compelled banks whose loans and 
off-balance sheet items grew by more than 20 percent to retain a portion of dividends, unless the 
bank’s capital adequacy ratio exceeded a high level.
14  If growth exceeded 30 percent, the capital 
adequacy ratio had to be even higher to avoid mandatory  dividend retention.  The growth rate 
limitation referred to a specific set of assets and off-balance sheet liabilities deemed to be credit 
related. 
In addition, the measure required  that  banks form general provisions for unidentified 
losses.  The general provision has a capital-like function.  However, there is an important tension 
between this requirement and IAS 39, which requires that provisions be based on well -identified 
evidence of future losses.   A similar problem plagued Spain ’s dynamic provisioning system, 
which  required  countercyclical  general  provisions.    Croatia’s  system  was  simpler,  but  also 
subject to some of the same objections from an accounting point of view. 
Since the limit for asset growth was set at the relatively high level of 20 percent in 2004, 
and because the measure did not take effect if capital adequacy levels were high, the dividend 
retention provisions rarely kicked in during  2004 and 2005.  Most large banks did not have 
                                                 
13 Loans that otherwise qualified for a 50 percent risk weight, such as home mortgages, carried a 75 percent risk 
weight if the borrower was unhedged. Loans that otherwise qualified for a 100 percent risk weight carried a 125 
percent risk weight to unhedged borrowers. These higher risk weights were raised another 25 percentage points in 
January 2008 (to 100 percent and 150 percent respectively).  
14 The definition of credits was the same as for the CGR, including all loans and debt instruments purchased except 
for loans to the Government and Croatian National Bank and M inistry of Finance paper. Off -balance sheet items 
included letters of credit, bills of exchange, funding commitments, and lines of credit. The requirement to retain 
dividends did not apply to banks whose credit aggregate growth was below 30 percent if capital adequacy was above 
15 percent. Higher capital adequacy was required to waive dividend retention at higher rates of growth. Finally, 
newly founded banks were not required to comply with this measure in their first three years of doing business.   16 
portfolio growth high enough to exceed the limit, while most small banks had capital adequacy 
levels so high that they were exempt.  However, the lowering of the growth limit to 15 percent in 
2006 made the dividend-retention measure much more relevant, and that year alone accounted for 
over half of the total of general provisions formed over the 2004–2008 period (about HRK 1.7 
billion in total).  The general provisions formed in 2006 also accounted for almost one third of 
banks’ after-tax profits for that year. 
Afterward, as the global crisis set in, bank credit growth rates began to decline, resulting 
in  a  significant  drop  in  new  general  reserves  formed  in  both  2007  and  2008.    In  2009,  the 
measure was  abandoned altogether, but  an  even stricter replacement  measure was  already in 
place:  since  the beginning  of 2008, banks  growing faster than 12 percent per annum  had to 
maintain a higher than usual minimum capital adequacy ratio, proportionate to the share of non-
core (potentially unstable) funding in their total funding structure.  However, lower bank credit 
growth and capital-raising efforts during the crisis have made this measure non-binding for most 
banks for the foreseeable future.  Only five smaller banks found it binding during 2008–2009 and 
had to increase their capital specifically because of this measure.  Thus, overall, it appears that 
the above capital/provisioning measures had a positive impact on the capital buffers of the faster 
growing banks going into the crisis period. 
It is also worth mentioning that Croatia enacted a minimum capital adequacy requirement 
of 10 percent in 1999.  This was intended to offset the higher risks present on the Croatian 
banking  market  due  to  the  challenges  of  the  transition  such  as  the  lack  of  a  credit  culture, 
including the unfamiliarity of borrowers with the risks of debt, and the lack of a credit bureau 
(until 2004); weak creditor protection, including a very slow legal process; connected lending and 
unwarranted political influence and corruption; and a lack of historical data on which to base 
credit assessments.  This higher capital minimum was not of course countercyclical, but it did 
serve to provide larger buffers against failure, giving banks and supervisors more time to respond 
to problems. 
Finally, the Croatian National Bank adopted a further measure in January 2008 requiring 
that rapidly growing banks hold higher levels of capital.  The measure set special, bank-specific 
capital requirements based on the rate of growth of credit and the bank’s reliance on funding 
sources other than core deposits.
15  In this way, the measure penalized banks that expanded their 
loan book by relying on non-deposit funding sources such as foreign borrowing.  
Since this measure was imposed at the very end of the boom period, it did not directly 
limit banks’ credit behavior.  However, the measure remains an avenue for slowing credit growth, 
particularly in the future when Croatia adopts the euro. 
3.7. Loan-to-value ratio limitations—a measure not taken 
One suggestion to limit credit growth that was closely examined was the imposition of a 
limitation on loan-to-value (LTV) or loan-to-income (LTI) ratios.  Some of these proposals were 
                                                 
15 Specifically, the base for calculating credit growth was the same as for the CGR and dividend-retention measures. 
The rate of secondary funding sources was calculated as the total liabilities minus deposits from households with a 
maturity of three months or more, divided by total liabilities. The required capital adequacy ratio was then calculated 
as 12 + 1.5 ((Credit growth rate*Secondary Funding rate/73.4)-12). The constant 73.4 was chosen as the system-
wide average secondary funding rate. The measure required that banks hold 12 percent capital adequacy plus a 150 
percent penalty on credit growth above 12 percent, with the penalty multiplied by the degree to which the bank relied 
on secondary funding sources.   17 
aimed particularly at household loans, especially home mortgages; however, in the end, the CNB 
chose not to implement such measures.  
The arguments against using such measures were both prudential and social.   On the 
prudential side, it was felt that the high risk weights already placed on home mortgages provided 
adequate buffers against possible losses.  This was because the overwhelming majority of home 
mortgages were indexed to foreign currency (until 2004, euro indexation was predominant, but in 
the  2004–2008  period,  Swiss  franc  indexation  grew  rapidly).    Because  of  this,  banks  were 
required to place risk weights of 125 percent (150 percent in 2008) on these loans.  In addition, 
banks still required that two people co-sign the loans, leading to a very high rate of recovery even 
when the original borrower was unable to pay.  
Finally, banks were already fairly conservative in their practices regarding LTV ratios, 
which rarely exceeded 80 percent.  In hindsight, one could object that these LTV ratios were 
based on high real estate prices resulting from unsustainable rates of price growth.  However, this 
argument was not deemed to be strong in the Croatian case, in part because it was assessed that 
real  estate  prices  in  Croatia  were  undergoing  a  process  of  convergence  to  EU  levels.    This 
implied that the increase in real estate prices represented a trend rather than a cycle.  
The social aspect of the loan-to-value limitation was the concern that rigid limitations 
would hit first-time borrowers and younger families disproportionately.  Since home mortgages 
had not been widely and easily available for a long period prior to the early 2000s, there was a 
perception  that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  pent-up  demand,  particularly  among  these  socially 
disadvantaged strata. 
The CNB also decided against loan installment to income limits.  It was believed that 
loans could easily be low risk even if loan installments exceeded a rule-of-thumb limit of 35 
percent or 50 percent.  In fact, Croatian banks were in the practice of allowing loan installments 
to reach a point where borrowers would have disposable income after loan repayment equal to an 
―existential minimum.‖  This existential minimum varied from bank to bank, sometimes ranging 
as low as the minimum wage and sometimes reaching figures two to three times higher than the 
minimum wage.  The practice can well be criticized, especially considering that the calculation of 
the existential minimum did not take into account the possibility that exchange rate depreciation 
would increase the loan installment.  
Still, the CNB felt that loan-to-income limitations would be unnecessarily restrictive and 
could hit lower-income borrowers too strongly.  In particular, the widespread participation in the 
unofficial economy, with many households receiving a secondary or even primary income as 
unrecorded income, in part or as a whole would render large numbers of households virtually 
―unbankable‖ had the strict LTI policy been implemented. 
Another possibility, discussed above in the context of the CGR, was to place a lower limit 
on household lending than on corporate lending.  The administrative challenges of implementing 
such  a  measure,  along  with  the  possibility  that  implementing  such  a  measure  might  have 
encouraged non-bank lenders to step in and offset any decline in bank lending to households, 
persuaded the CNB to eschew such measures.  This decision was taken despite the widespread 
belief that bank lending was excessively skewed toward households. 
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3.8. A note on monitoring 
All of the measures described above were monitored via reporting to the central bank.  
The FLCR and foreign exchange position limit had to be met daily.  In the case of the FLCR, 
reports for each day were only sent for a whole month at a time, while the position limit was 
actually reported daily along with a set of reserve and liquidity reports.  The CGR was monitored 
monthly, as was the MRR.  The dividend restriction on rapidly growing banks was part of the 
quarterly prudential reporting framework. 
The accuracy of these reports was confirmed by on-site inspections.  The Supervision 
Department of the Croatian National Bank does on-site inspection of compliance with monetary 
measures, as well as compliance with prudential measures.  
However, the greatest challenge was to detect the evasion channels used by banks.  This 
was done through conversations with bankers, examination of bank reports off-site, and on-site 
examinations.  The cat-and-mouse game, however, is ongoing, with the banks always a step 
ahead of the regulators. 
 
4. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE 
CREDIT BOOM 
As a result of the limited time frame and the overlapping of many of the measures, it is 
difficult to make reliable quantitative estimates of their impacts.  Galac (2010) provides the most 
systematic econometric and quantitative analysis undertaken so far. Here we reinterpret, extend, 
and revise that analysis in several directions.  First, we examine the effectiveness of attempts to 
control credit growth.  Next, we look at measures aimed at discriminating among different forms 
of capital inflows, and last we look at measures whose goal was to boost liquidity and capital 
buffers. 
On credit growth, as already discussed, Galac (2010) finds statistical evidence that the 
credit  growth  reserve  (CGR)  successfully  reduced  the  pace  of  growth  of  credit  extended  by 
domestic commercial banks  to  the non-financial private sector.  However, the same analysis 
suggests that the reduction of this credit growth measure was compensated for by an increase in 
foreign debt growth so that overall, the effect of the CGR on the pace of growth of total debt of 
the private non-financial sector was not statistically significant.
16  Here, we repeat the empirical 
exercise from Galac (2010), breaking down credit growth into total, non-financial companies and 
households.  The results are presented in Table 1. 
The  regression  estimates  in  the  equation  for  total  debt  (total  of  households  and 
enterprises, foreign and domestic) are presented in the left section of Table 1.  They correspond 
closely to those estimated by Galac (2010) on a shorter dataset and usin g a slightly different 
specification of the model.  Thus, there is no statistical evidence on the effectiveness of the CGR 
at curbing overall corporate and household debt during the two periods of its implementation 
when viewed together.   However, the middle and the right section of Table 1 indicate that the 
                                                 
16 The debt owed to domestic non-banking financial institutions is missing from the aggregate because monthly data 
on their operations is unavailable. As explained by Galac (2010), quarterly data on these institutions indicate that 
there was marked substitution from banks to leasing companies in particular during periods when CGR was active. 
This consideration highlights the ineffectiveness of the CGR regarding corporate and total debt, and weakens the 
argument for its effectiveness with respect to household debt, all presented in Table 1.   19 
negative result may be entirely due to its inability to affect corporate borrowing, while there is 
strong evidence that household borrowing indeed slowed when CGR was active.  This is broadly 
in  line  with  what  one  could  expect  in  the  period  analyzed,  given  the  restrictions  on  natural 
persons banking abroad and a lack of  such restrictions for legal persons after 2002.  It also 
suggests that the CGR could have contributed to slowing down the household lending boom and 
perhaps even the current account deficit, which are certainly both aims of central bank policy.  
Finally, the unexpectedly positive and significant initial effect when the CGR is implemented or 
tightened, in all three specifications, can probably be explained by inertia, that is, prior loan 
commitments by banks that had to be honored even as the CGR began to bite. 
Table 1. Credit growth and credit growth limits, 2000–2010 
N=120, 2001/01-2010/12 
Y=DLOG(Total_debt)  Y=DLOG(NFC_debt)  Y=DLOG(HH_debt) 
                          
X  coeff.  s.e.  p-value  coeff.  s.e.  p-value  coeff.  s.e.  p-value 
(HAC std. errors)                            
Constant  0,0166  0,0023  0,0000  0,0134  0,0024  0,0000  0,0145  0,0020  0,0000 
Y(t-1)  -0,1603  0,0859  0,0645  -0,0863  0,0917  0,3485  0,0459  0,1078  0,6713 
Y(t-12)  0,1685  0,0919  0,0694  0,2382  0,1115  0,0348  0,2600  0,0908  0,0050 
CGR effective (t)  -0,0011  0,0016  0,4923  -0,0006  0,0024  0,8122  -0,0043  0,0019  0,0286 
CGR increased (t)  0,0062  0,0014  0,0000  0,0040  0,0023  0,0860  0,0112  0,0030  0,0004 
EMBI Spread, Croatia (t-1)  0,0000  0,0000  0,0001  0,0000  0,0000  0,0009  0,0000  0,0000  0,0001 
Outlier/2001-08  0,0404  0,0017  0,0000  0,0383  0,0027  0,0000  0,0504  0,0016  0,0000 
Outlier/2002-07  0,0242  0,0017  0,0000           0,0357  0,0018  0,0000 
Outlier/2002-10  0,0208  0,0010  0,0000           0,0329  0,0016  0,0000 
Outlier/2008-01  0,0234  0,0014  0,0000  0,0374  0,0022  0,0000          
                             
Mean Y  0,0120        0,0110        0,0142       
SD(Y)  0,0103        0,0116        0,0130       
Adj. R square  0,3842        0,2499        0,4509       
AIC  -6,7250        -6,2957        -6,3744       
BIC  -6,4927        -6,1099        -6,1653       
HQC  -6,6306        -6,2202        -6,2895       
DW  2,0955        2,1210        2,1027       
 
Regarding capital inflows into the banking sector, Galac (2010) finds strong statistical 
evidence that the rate of the marginal reserve requirement (MRR) is positively associated with 
bank capital formation,  in addition to some faint evidence that the existence of the MRR is 
negatively  associated  with  banks’  foreign  borrowing.    Here,  we  first  examine  whether  the 
statistical  evidence  on  bank  capital  formation  is  robust  to  the  introduction  of  the  prudential 
measures described in sections 3.5 and 3.6 into the analysis.  To this end, three equations for 
monthly additions to the aggregate bank capital are presented in Table 2. 
The first equation, which is similar to the one estimated in Galac (2010), shows that the 
results reflecting the effectiveness of the MRR at stimulating bank recapitalization are sensitive 
to the presence of other prudential measures in the model.  However, the model implicit in the 
first equation may not be adequate because of the presence of extreme outliers for two months 
during the period analyzed.  These were explicitly taken into account in the second equation, 
which  significantly  strengthened  the  results  indicated  by  the  model  and  suggested  that  the 
November 2006 outlier could  possibly be  connected to  the introduction of foreign currency-
linked liabilities into the FCLR base in the previous month.  Since the MRR rate was already at 
its maximum at that time, it is possible that the cheapest way for banks to adjust to this change of 
the measure was to raise capital and then invest it in additional liquid foreign currency assets to   20 
satisfy the FCLR.  In contrast, the March 2007 extreme outlier cannot be related in a meaningful 
way to any important event. 
Table 2. Prudential measures and bank recapitalization, 2001-2010 
N=121, 2000/12-2010/12  Y=DLOG(Bank_capital) 
X  coeff.  s.e.  p-value  coeff.  s.e.  p-value  coeff.  s.e.  p-value 
(HAC std. errors)                            
Constant  0,0024  0,0020  0,2230  0,0016  0,0017  0,3494  0,0016  0,0013  0,2289 
Y(t-1)  -0,0190  0,0728  0,7946  0,0524  0,0492  0,2892  0,0542  0,0487  0,2682 
Y(t-12)  0,2287  0,1238  0,0673  0,3293  0,0837  0,0001  0,3308  0,0821  0,0001 
MRR rate %  0,0001  0,0001  0,2168  0,0001  0,0001  0,3561  0,0002  0,0000  0,0009 
MRR effective  0,0050  0,0043  0,2515  0,0036  0,0039  0,3528          
gen. bank res. req. in place  -0,0029  0,0028  0,2946  -0,0007  0,0022  0,7617          
FCICR weights in place  0,0045  0,0024  0,0599  0,0039  0,0024  0,1072  0,0038  0,0023  0,0962 
stricter gen. bank res. req. in place  -0,0016  0,0055  0,7682  -0,0067  0,0041  0,1066  -0,0074  0,0034  0,0294 
Outlier, 2006/11           0,0448  0,0021  0,0000  0,0449  0,0020  0,0000 
Outlier, 2007/03           0,0795  0,0025  0,0000  0,0796  0,0025  0,0000 
                             
Mean Y  0,0090        0,0090        0,0090       
SD(Y)  0,0141        0,0141        0,0141       
Adj. R square  0,1987        0,5266        0,5340       
AIC  -5,8486        -6,3596        -6,3906       
BIC  -5,6637        -6,1286        -6,2058       
HQC  -5,7735        -6,2658        -6,3155       
DW  1,9579        1,9896        1,9853       
 
Overall, the second equation in Table 2 indicates that there may be no single measure that 
alone stimulated bank recapitalizations in the 2004–2008 period.  However, this result may be 
driven by the interaction of different measures due to overlapping periods of their implementation 
and/or the construction of the two MRR variables and the two general banking reserves variables, 
which may represent highly correlated pairs.  Therefore, in the final step, the dummy indicator 
for the existence of MRR (found insignificant by Galac (2010)) and the dummy indicator for the 
existence of general bank reserves (highly insignificant in the second equation) are excluded from 
the second equation.  The resulting third equation in Table 2 describes the data at hand just as 
well as the second equation, but unlike the latter, it provides strong statistical evidence about the 
positive  relationship  between  the  MRR  rate  and  bank  capital  additions  (in  line  with  Galac 
(2010)), as well as an indication of a modest positive impact of FCICR risk weight add-ons. 
Galac (2010) also attempts to quantify the impact of all central bank measures together on 
the building of bank capital buffers in the period leading up to the crisis through simulations.  
This analysis concludes that under several realistic counterfactual scenarios in which no new 
monetary and prudential measures drive capital-raising efforts in the 2004–2008 period, banks 
would have had an aggregate shortfall of capital of between HRK 11 billion and 13 billion (just 
under EUR 2 billion) at the height of the crisis, against the actually observed shortfall of around 
HRK 6 billion, with the difference of HRK 5 billion to7 billion representing about 1.5 percent to 
2 percent of end-2008 banking sector assets.  This analysis also finds that under an extreme 
scenario in which the central bank would not have relaxed its prudential measures during the 
crisis, this difference could have been as high as HRK 22 billion.  In either case, it appears   21 
obvious that the counterfactual capital buffers would have contributed to the severity of the credit 
slowdown during the crisis. 
In the context of our analysis,  it is interesting to consider how much of  the baseline 
difference of 5 billion to 7 billion in the shortfall of capital could be attributed to general banking 
provisions from section 3.6 of this paper, the only measure not explicitly considered in Galac 
(2010).    First,  it  must  be  noted  that  although  the  measure  was  not  explicitly  part  of  the 
calculation, implicitly all monetary and prudential measures were included in the simulation, 
allowing  us  to  leave  the  simulated  figures  unaltered.    Data  also  indicate  that  of  the  general 
provisions formed in the 2004–2008 period, almost the entire amount of HRK 1.7 billion was 
formed prior to 2008, thus prior to the crisis.  Therefore, the general provision measure can be 
credited with between one fourth and one third of the hypothetical reduction in the 2008 capital 
shortfall due to central bank measures. 
Counterfactual simulations of liquidity buffers in Galac (2010) appear somewhat more 
benign.  They indicate that under the 2002 monetary policy, ceteris paribus, banks’ liquidity 
buffers built over the 2003–2008 period up to the Lehman Brothers episode would have been 
HRK 5 billion higher in the domestic currency segment and HRK 6.5 billion lower in the foreign 
currency segment.  It is shown, although not explicitly stated, that the greatest driver of this 
outcome were increases to the kuna holding requirement (KHR), which was implemented in 2003 
(three times), 2005, and 2009. 
Therefore, the role of the FCLR and MRR was to partially compensate for the slower 
(than the counterfactual) build-up of traditional foreign currency required reserves during the 
period.  It is arguable whether the FCLR and MRR reserves were more liquid; banks may have 
simply used them more readily during the height of the crisis than they would have used the latter 
(required reserves).  In any event, although total foreign currency reserves accumulated up to the 
crisis peak were lower than the counterfactual, they appear to have been adequate in retrospect, 
since they provided enough of a cushion to preserve financial stability during the crisis.  At the 
same time, building foreign currency liquidity buffers under the FCLR and MRR yielded a more 
restrictive monetary policy than would have been possible under the counterfactual, which in 
retrospect seems indisputable. 
 
5. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
Many  of  the  key  issues  facing  macroprudential  policy  in  Croatia  flow  from  the 
implications of the evolving European framework for banking supervision, financial stability, and 
cross-border  cooperation.    In  this  section,  we  will  briefly  review  Croatia’s  experience  with 
managing  financial  stability  issues  during  the  crisis  and  discuss  the  main  challenges  Croatia 
faces. 
5.1. Cross-border cooperation during the crisis 
The Croatian banking system has been largely under foreign ownership since 2000.  Since 
all the foreign-owned institutions were subsidiaries as of the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
Croatian  supervisors  had  full  authority  over  these  banks.    While  the  issue  of  home-host 
cooperation is an important and delicate one, the crisis did not produce any major issues where 
such cooperation failed.   22 
The biggest cross-border issues involved ensuring that foreign owners would and could 
stand  by  their  subsidiaries,  particularly  in  the  turbulent  weeks  after  the  failure  of  Lehman 
Brothers.  The central bank’s move to lift the marginal reserve requirement in October 2008 
facilitated foreign banks’ efforts to provide liquidity support to their subsidiaries.  Together, the 
foreign owners and the central  bank, along with the Croatian  Government, which raised the 
deposit  insurance  level  from  HRK  100,000  to  HRK  400,000,  succeeded  in  stabilizing  the 
situation. 
An  additional  concern  as  the  crisis  continued  was  that  parent  banks  would  seek  to 
compensate  for  losses  in  their  home  markets  through  large  dividend  payments  or  capital 
decreases in the subsidiaries.  Considerable moral pressure was exerted by the central bank to 
prevent this from happening.  In addition, the Vienna Initiative proved to be a very important 
international effort to prevent foreign banks from abandoning markets in the Central and East 
European region.  Overall, it seems fair to say that these efforts succeeded.  
There were no failures of foreign banks in Croatia during the financial crisis.  For this 
reason,  the  issue  of  burden  sharing  did  not  materialize.    Since  all  the  foreign  banks  were 
organized  as  subsidiaries,  any  recapitalization  or  restructuring  would  have  come  exclusively 
under Croatian law.  However, if a foreign subsidiary were to fail in the future, it would be 
difficult  to  imagine  the  Croatian  Government  stepping  in  and  using  taxpayers’  money  to 
recapitalize the bank.  More likely, the burden would be placed on the parent’s owners, or the 
home country government. 
5.2. Capital flows: Looking ahead 
Although  the  financial  crisis  has  substantially  decreased  capital  inflows,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  think  that  Croatia  will  experience  substantial  inflows  in  the  future.    Croatian 
borrowers are likely to turn to European sources when they can because interest rates remain 
more favorable outside of Croatia, particularly in the euro zone.  Croatia’s expected accession to 
the EU and subsequent membership in the euro zone would likely erode this differential, but will 
not eliminate it quickly. 
In addition, Croatian banks are likely to turn to international debt markets again. In the 
near term, the need for debt financing will be limited by slow loan demand from both domestic 
enterprises and households.  However, once economic growth accelerates, one would expect a 
return to international debt markets by Croatian banks.  
Another form of capital inflows that should be anticipated is FDI.  Croatia’s domestically 
owned banks, which are mainly small and medium sized, are already perceived to be attractive 
takeover targets for foreign banks seeking entry into the Croatian market.  Even though tight 
regulation may limit profit rates relative to the high levels achieved in the past—the return on 
average equity of the Croatian banking system has fallen from a high of 16.1 percent in 2004 to 
only 6.4 percent in 2009—the growth potential of the Croatian market seems far greater than that 
of developed European markets.
17  This implies continued FDI in the banking industry.  
FDI in other sectors of the economy can also be  anticipated, especially as EU accession 
improves the legal  and regulatory  framework.    However, Croatia still has work to do on 
streamlining procedures for business establishment and decreasing corruption.   These obstacles 
                                                 
17 Data from www.hnb.hr, ―SPF‖. http://www.hnb.hr/publikac/hpublikac.htm   23 
could continue to limit FDI, which until now has largely been concentrated in service sectors 
such as banking, retail, and telecommunications. 
Inward  portfolio  investment  could  come  from  corporate  borrowers  tapping  European 
bond markets and the Croatian Government.  So far, very few corporate borrowers have achieved 
the degree of transparency and corporate governance needed to tap the bond markets, and few are 
large  enough  to  justify  the  costs  of  issuing  bonds.    It  seems  unlikely  that  this  will  change 
dramatically in the near future. 
Government, however, seems  likely to  continue to  need to  tap bond markets.  Fiscal 
deficits have ballooned during the crisis, with the general government deficit rising from 1.4 
percent in 2008 to 4.1 percent in 2009 and an estimated 5 percent in 2010 (according to the ESA 
95 methodology). 
As a condition of EU accession, Croatia is required to eliminate capital controls, the most 
important of which was the MRR.  More precisely, controls may only be imposed for a six-month 
period, with another six-month period allowed with parliamentary approval.   This presents a 
significant challenge to macroprudential policy since interest rate differentials and perceptions of 
high growth potential on the Croatian market could lead to a new surge of capital inflows in the 
future.  The issue, of course, is not unique to Croatia, but it is one that needs to be addressed 
seriously. 
Another implication of EU accession is the liberalization of capital outflows.  Although 
yields on assets may be high in Croatia in nominal terms, investors may seek foreign assets for 
reasons of diversification, perceived security, or because certain types of assets are available only 
outside of Croatia.  Moderate capital outflows that counterbalance capital inflows might even be 
beneficial from a macroeconomic point of view, as they would alleviate appreciation pressure. 
However, larger outflows could be destabilizing.  
5.3. Home-host cooperation and the question of branches 
Although it is not yet an EU member, Croatia participates in colleges of supervisors at the 
EU level.  While cooperation has been fruitful in the colleges, there are important concerns going 
forward.  First, current EU legislation on colleges gives great discretion to the home supervisor 
regarding  the  involvement  of  host  country  supervisors  in  the  college.    Theoretically,  home 
supervisors  have  little  obligation  to  include  host  supervisors  in  crucial  decisions  or  even  to 
inform them fully of developments in the home country bank or the bank group as a whole.  
Although a dispute resolution mechanism has now been established with the European Banking 
Supervision Authority, this has happened after the fact.  Crisis resolution protocols and exercises 
have been created, but it is unclear whether these will be of great help in an actual crisis situation.  
Another crucial issue for Croatia is the question of systemic branches.  At present, none of 
the foreign banks in Croatia is present in branch form; once Croatia joins the EU, its supervisors 
will have no say over the establishment of branches by EU banks.  Furthermore, there does not 
seem to be any legal barrier to existing subsidiaries changing into branches. If one of the largest 
Croatian banks were to convert from a subsidiary into a branch, it would constitute a systemic 
branch—a bank with market share perhaps as high as 10 percent or even 30 percent—that would 
not be subject to supervision by Croatian supervisors. 
It is not clear whether such conversion would be attractive to bank owners.  Taxation 
would be a crucial consideration as well as both the stringency of regulation and the nature of   24 
enforcement.  Reputation would also be of major importance, since a change in legal status could 
change depositors’ perceptions of bank safety.  The fact that a large retail branch has functioned 
successfully in Estonia (Nordea) suggests that conversion from subsidiary to branch might well 
be feasible. 
The emergence of a situation whereby a systemically important institution is not under the 
supervision of national supervisors would be challenging to say the least.  The nub of the matter 
is not national pride or even sovereignty, but simply that a large subsidiary in Croatia or any 
other small market would only represent a minor share of the whole parent bank group.  This 
could mean that the home country supervisors would not have the necessary incentives to expend 
adequate resources on supervision of the systemically important branch.  We believe that this is 
an issue that requires attention at the EU level, since it affects numerous countries other than 
Croatia.  Under the current architecture of supervision in the EU, it seems reasonable to stipulate 
that  host  supervisors  should  keep  their  authority,  or  at  least  share  authority  with  the  home 
country, in suitably defined systemically important branches. 
5.4. The definition of bank groups and macroprudential measures 
Cross-border cooperation also raises the issue of defining bank groups.  Even when the 
domestic bank is a subsidiary, other related members of the bank group may be under the direct 
ownership of the parent group.  If this is the case, these non-bank group members may only be 
part of a  group at  the  home country level  and not  at  the host country level.   This  deprives 
supervisors and central banks of authority to levy many kinds of macroprudential measures on all 
of the bank group’s affiliates in the host country.  
An example of this in Croatia involved leasing companies. In some of the country’s bank 
groups, leasing companies were directly owned by the parent bank.  This meant that the credit 
growth reserve could not be imposed on the bank and leasing company together, since these 
institutions did not form a bank group together.  Instead, the banking group existed at the home 
country level, under the supervisory authority of the home country supervisors.  This created a 
channel for evasion of the CGR.  
While  it  seems  reasonable  to  stipulate  that  the  leasing  company  should  not  be 
consolidated with the subsidiary for prudential purposes, since the leasing company’s loan losses 
would  reflect  the  soundness  of  the  parent  bank  and  not  the  subsidiary,  the  macroprudential 
approach seeks to limit activities by all domestic credit granting institutions, which would indeed 
include  both  the  bank  subsidiary  and  the  leasing  company.    In  order  to  permit  this  kind  of 
macroprudential regulation, it would be necessary to modify the definition of groups of credit 
institutions  under  the  EU  Capital  Requirements  Directive  (CRD—EU  Directive  48/2006)  or 
define a different kind of group for macroprudential purposes. 
Clearly, it would not be fair to force bank groups to comply with consolidated supervision 
at the group level and also at the host country level in cases such as these.  However, there might 
be a case for host country consolidation to implement certain kinds of macroprudential measures.  
This point seems particularly relevant in light of the limited tools available to EU member states 
to control capital inflows, regardless of whether the country has adopted the euro.  While one 
could  argue  that  capital  inflows  to  euro  zone  members  should  be  regarded  as  analogous  to 
regional flows within a single country, the principle of subsidiarity and the continued national 
sovereignty of EU member states could also be invoked in favor of measures to regulate capital 
flows.  Furthermore, the experience of the financial crisis raises sharp questions about whether   25 
conventional monetary policy instruments are adequate to stem the capital inflows that fuelled the 
credit booms of 2004 to 2008. 
5.5. Basel III 
If the essential ideas of Basel III are that banks should hold higher buffers of capital and 
liquidity, then Croatia certainly had a head start.  Croatia’s 10 percent minimum capital adequacy 
requirement was higher than the international standard and its higher risk weights for foreign 
currency-indexed loans to unhedged borrowers aimed to increase capital buffers, while the FCLR 
represented an important liquidity regulation. 
The  CRD  (Basel  II)  in  many  ways  represented  a  lowering  of  capital  adequacy 
requirements. Risks weights on mortgage loans were only 50 percent in many cases, and a large 
portion of other loans to households actually could qualify for 35 percent risk weights.  These 
lower risk weights alone served to decrease capital requirements.  In addition, the CRD did not 
allow for the higher risk weights for FCICR used by Croatia.  Overall, these provisions decreased 
risk weights  to  such an extent that the CNB estimated that the adoption of the CRD would 
increase the capital adequacy ratio of the Croatian banking system as a whole by 2 percentage 
points—and this is only in the standardized approach; the more sophisticated internal ratings-
based approaches could well imply even larger increases in capital adequacy. 
The CNB responded to this problem by raising the minimum capital adequacy ratio to 12 
percent in the Credit Institutions Act, passed in September 2008.  Beyond that, the main tool 
available under the CRD appears to be the ICAAP.  This process requires banks to define the 
capital  that  they  consider  appropriate  given  their  business  activities  and  risk  appetite.    This 
internal assessment is then supervised by the CNB.  The supervisors do have the power to compel 
banks to amend their ICAAP if it is inadequate.  Through this process, the supervisors can require 
banks to consider risks unique to the Croatian market, including FCICR.  In principle, ICAAP is 
conducted on a bank-by-bank basis, in contrast to earlier CNB decisions compelling all banks to 
implement higher risk weights. 
In  the  area  of  liquidity,  the  CNB  used  its  authority  under  the  CRD  to  implement  a 
regulation  requiring  banks  to  maintain  liquid  assets  and  expected  cash  inflows  greater  than 
expected cash outflows at one-week and one-month horizons.  The measure defines categories of 
liquid assets with haircuts, although it also  allows banks to utilize their own assessments of 
haircuts under certain conditions.  This measure anticipates the liquidity requirements of Basel 
III, requiring substantial liquidity buffers that are expected to be resistant to liquidity shocks. 
Furthermore, the regulation requires stress testing of liquidity, which was certainly not 
implemented adequately before the financial crisis.  Only time will tell whether this new attempt 
to  stress  test  liquidity  will  yield better results  than the  more straightforward linear measures 
employed in the past. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Croatia experienced a strong credit boom, which it made substantial efforts to manage.  
The  monetary  policy  approach  chosen  attempted  to  dampen  capital  inflows  by  avoiding  an 
interest rate-based sterilization policy.  Instead, measures were taken to make foreign funding   26 
sources more expensive using the MRR and to directly limit credit expansion.  General reserve 
requirements were high and required reserves were remunerated at very low rates. 
In  addition,  responding  to  the  special  challenges  of  extensive  euroization  and  the 
difficulties in providing an LOLR in such a context, the central bank required banks to hold high 
levels of liquidity as a form of self-insurance.  A tightly managed exchange rate was used to 
prevent  the  activation  of  credit  risk  resulting  from  lending  in  foreign  currency  to  unhedged 
borrowers (FCICR). 
Finally, the central bank implemented a number of policies aimed at forcing banks to hold 
large capital buffers.  A legal minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10 percent, higher risk weights 
for lending indexed to foreign currency, and limits on dividend disbursement by rapidly growing 
banks were the key measures employed. 
While it is difficult to provide reliable quantitative assessments of these measures, we 
suggest that the overall monetary approach was sound.  Although capital inflows were strong and 
credit expanded rapidly, the exchange rate remained reasonably stable and a sharp depreciation 
crisis was avoided.  Financial institution distress was avoided as well, quite unlike in the period 
after the Asian and Russian crises when a major episode of expensive bank closures took place in 
Croatia.  
Direct credit controls seem to have worked in controlling lending by domestic banks, but 
were  vulnerable  to  evasion  through  increased  foreign  borrowing  and  the  use  of  leasing  and 
balance sheet manipulation.  Importantly, direct credit controls do appear to have been effective 
in slowing household borrowing.  This is significant in light of concerns that bank lending was 
unhealthily skewed toward households during the boom.  In addition, since many of the goods 
households purchased with credit were imported (above all, cars), the CGR may have curtailed 
imports somewhat and improved the current account deficit, a major problem for Croatia. 
The marginal reserve requirement and introduction of FCICR risk weights, by contrast, 
seems to have been fairly effective at motivating banks to raise capital rather than borrow abroad, 
although such effects were not constant and certainly did not stop foreign borrowing altogether. 
Finally, measures requiring that banks build up higher liquidity and capital have helped 
the banking system enter the financial crisis in a more robust condition.  Since our simulation 
results find that the measures substantially reduced the amount of capital banks needed to raise 
once the crisis hit, we feel convinced that this proactive approach to capital raising lowered the 
cost of providing capital, thereby facilitating crisis management. 
In  general,  while  the  econometric  evidence  about  the  effectiveness  of  individual 
macroprudential measures is not always very strong, it is possible that the measures succeeded as 
a package, since some of the measures undoubtedly reinforced the effectiveness of others.  Thus, 
our attempts to isolate the effects of one measure may understate the effectiveness of Croatia’s 
macroprudential approach as a whole. 
While Croatia avoided major problems with cross-border coordination during the crisis, 
its  experience  suggests  a  number  of  important  areas  for  further  elaboration  of  the  European 
financial  architecture.    Fiscal  burden  sharing  and  the  treatment  of  systemic  branches  remain 
thorny issues that could be of crucial importance for Croatia if any of its large banks convert from 
subsidiaries  into  branches.    It  also  remains  unclear  whether  the  possibilities  open  under  the 
ICAAP will be as effective as Croatia’s earlier approach of prescribing higher risk weights for   27 
foreign currency-indexed lending to unhedged borrowers.  These problems are not unique to 
Croatia, but also face a number of smaller European countries with a large presence by foreign 
banks, as well as those current and future EU members in which deposit or liability euroization 
plays a major role.  
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